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Resale Price Maintenance: What do Economists Know 
and When did Tliey Know it? 
Professor EREIT'S [l9911 paper is an insightfill, thorough and also critical assess- 
ment of what the profession seems to know about resale price maintenance 
(RPM). Of course he develops a prima.rily American perspective. Using a lively 
style, he unfolds interesiing aspects of the history of economic thought on 
RPhI. Thus, a subject which seemed to rnany econonlists definitely dead and 
buried is revitalized. 
I do agree with Professor Breir's closing words t.hat - regarding RPM - " 'the 
end O S  history' has not yet arrived" and I may add: combining the American 
view of the history of RPM with the European one - or at least with the 
German development - rneans that some parts of Professor Breit's history have 
to be rewritten. 
Le1 me start \vith Prof. Breit's initial proposition: "Alfred Marshall's Princi- 
ples n r  Economics was the first commodity in the English-speaking world to be 
sold under a scheme of resale price maintenance." (p. 72) If this were true for 
the whole world, we could pour out some champagne and celebrate the centen- 
nial ol' that institutional innovation; or, if you have a different stance on this 
matier. we could be happy that this anti-competitive measure has been more or 
less reinnved at last after one hundred years. But RPM is much older than a 
hundred years and it is hardly possible to date its birth exactly. Burkhard 
Roper, one of the older, but still living Gernlan economist-s who have closely 
studied RPM over some years, remarks in a quite recent article (R~PER [1981]) 
that PRhl in the book trade is more than 200 years old. There is also evidence 
that RPM for branded industrial goods was introduced in Germany before 
1877. So let us be careful with dating birthdays. Of course I would not see any 
advariiage in the fact that presumably RPM was introduced in Germany prior 
to the US or U#. What I want to point out is that it is very difficult to date 
precisely the beginning of some trade institution.' 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, in his correspondence with 1 ~ s  publisher Johann 
Fritdrtch Cotta, gives us knowledge that RPM alas implemcntcd already around the turn 
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Similar arguments can be advanced with respect to Prof. Breit's contention 
that "no published treatment of the subject is to be found in the economic 
literature prior to 3907," (p. 77) since I obtained one major publication on 
RPM that is prior to 1907. Published in 1895 by Ludwig POHLE [1895], it is a 
pretty long paper that offers a thorough account of the German cartel in the 
book trade; explores the factual development of RPM in book trade over the 
preceding hundred years; and describes the long-lasting fight of the book 
traders' association which eventually arrived at an overall agreement on RPM. 
Furthermore it also reflects many of the pros and cons that are discussed in 
Prof. Breit's paper, namely the service argument, hints to the free rider argu- 
ment, possible additional sales through RPM, reduction of transaction costs 
through RPM (costs of search and comparison). Pohle also compares the 
situation in Germany to that in England and maintains that RPM, which, at 
that time, was an exclusively German institution, provided greater welfare to 
consumers and dealers. All in all, he is in favor of RPM, and he points out that 
it was the trade and not the publishers who fought for RPM. 
Another early publication on RPM was written by E. ROSENBERG [1913]. He 
describes and discusses the development of vertical price restrictions in the 
pharmaceutical and in the cosmetic industry during the 19th century and shows 
under what conditions RPM agreements worked or broke up. 
Again it seems very difficult to date "What do econoinists know and when 
did they know it?" 
Tlus is also true for the free rider argument. POHLE [l8951 - in a rather weak 
way - has already used that argument in 1895. The English economist Basil 
Yamey, who published several pieces on RPM, described it already in 1954 in 
a very clear way, but without using the phrase "free riding" : 
"A retailer may hesitate to spend much on the provision of a large stock, adequate 
outlay and expert sales staff unless there is reasonable expectation that the benefits of his 
investment will accrue to him and not to his competitors. It is always possible that some 
customers will take advantage of his facilities, decide to buy, but make their purchases 
elsewhere. It  is reasonable to suppose that more customers will behave in this way if they 
can buy what they have selected cheaper from his conlpetitors; and his competitors may 
be able to undersell him because they do not provide the costly services of which they 
nevertheless get the benefit. In tlis way retail price competition may tend to inhibit 
expenditure on the provision of certain retail services and this may reduce the sales of the 
products." (YAMEY [1954, 52fl) 
of the 18th to the 19th century. This can be indirectly concluded from many pieces of that 
correspondence. A conspicuous example is the discussion of a new edition of Goethe's 
complete works in 1826. Refering to dissatisfactions in the booktrade, Goethe demands 
a different price policy from Cotta. It is obvious that resale prices are fixed by the 
publisher. In his interesting answer to Goethe, Cotta adds complaints of several German 
booksellers who demand higher discount rates within Cotta's price regime. See KUHN 
[1979, 177-1821 and [1983,152-1561. I thank Erich Schanze who drew my attention to 
this correspondence. 
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TI-(is descriptioi~ was six years prior to TELSER'S [l9601 article, where Prof. 
Rreit detected tlie free riding argument for the first time and where he sees the 
mail1 source for rethinking the benefits of RPM. 
Whirhout describing the legal development in Germany in full detail2, it 
might be noteworthy  hat in Germany the lsgal assessment of RPM took a 
different course compared to the US: it went froin supporting RPM to its 
prolnbition. At the beginning of the ceatury, a break of RPM agreements was 
rulecl t u  be incoinpatible with thc: Gernlan Unfair Trade Law. Later, RPM was 
allo~vcd only under certain conditions (branded goods, books) by anti-trust 
law. Only in 1973 was RPM generally prohibited by anti-trust law with the 
exception of boolcs and wed goods. There arc also exceptions for pharinaceu- 
ticals and energy, which are laid down in different laws. It could be interesting 
to discuss why the legal treatment of RPM developed so differently in the two 
coun~ries. And nlore atieiltion should be paid tc, the explanation of the eucep- 
tions ra new institutional economics terms. It also seeins remarkable that in 
Geri~~any it was very often the trade who denlanded RPM, not so much the 
manufactnsers. A t  least thi? is true for the book: industry. As far as I understand 
it fror~l Prof. Breit's paper, raanufacturess in tlie USA took tlie initiative. This 
difference should be discussed and an attempt made to explain it. For Gerillany 
it seems to be true that retailers, distributors and the like used to play a Inore 
iniportant role as constiluency and as voting potential than manufacturers. 
kil ore recent Gern~an research on RPM, namely the very thorough book of 
Herbert H.ilx [1961], discusses all the arguments that are presented in Prof. 
Breit's accouiit. This research is illore critical about the efficiency effccts of 
RPM. Theoretical and empirical evidence sho~v that (HAY [1961, 1651): 
- RPM leads to higher trade discount rates. 
- Dangers of damage to branded goods by loss leaders ia the absence of RPM 
arc cxaggerated. 
- Tendency towards open or de facto cartels of manufacturers and resalers is 
strengthened by RPh4. 
- Necessity for ratioisalizafion and selection of better sales and service struc- 
tures, especially developine~lt of new forins of marketing channels and distri- 
but~on system, is hindered. 
- No real advantages for the consumer could be detected in sevcral empirical 
studies. 
Thus. on balance, RI'hI seems to be merely an instrument for increasing 
marltrt power ~vithour increasing efficiency or consumers' welfare. 
"~t is interesting to note that the German Reichsgericht ruled already in 1890 on 
RPhI,, i.e. simultaneous with the alleged start of this institution in the English-spealcing 
world according to Prof. Breit. The court ruled that the orgaaiza.tion of RPhl in book- 
lrade is allowed under certain conditions. See RGZ [1592,235-2511 and SCHR~DER [1988, 
l1  -1 51. I thank \$Ternhard Mijschel who drew my attention i.o this early ruling. 
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It seems too, to be nothing more than a remainder of old feudal trade habits 
from times when the entry of new forms of trade into the market was not 
welcome. Perhaps in the 19th century it was also an efficient means of providing 
certain services in the absence of alternative solutions. Today, however, there 
are many alternatives to ensure the alleged advantages of RPM without creat- 
ing all the unfavorable side effects. To mention only a few alternatives: 
- The inanufacturer may deliver his goods to resalers only if the latter offers 
some minimum service. 
- The manufacturer may offer the necessary service himself (presale services 
such as practical demonstration in decentralized showrooms of the manufac- 
turer, advertising, handbooks, etc.). 
- The mailufactui-er inay integrate downstreain (direct sales, direct marketing). 
- The manufacturer can sell through agents who are not independent dealers. 
- The additional service is provided as an extra product (consulting, training, 
special journals, teachware, etc.), or as a quasi-public good (constuner educa- 
tion and consumer information by mass inedia such as radio and TV). 
We can clearly observe many of these institutional solutions today in various 
markets. Of course, all these and similar solutions must be evaluated in terms 
of transaction costs. The main point is that there exists a high potential for 
institutional alternatives to RPM. Abolishing RPM means introducing creativ- 
ity for new forms of products, services or marketing channels in the area of th; 
former RPM-products. 
To put it differently: it is surprising that in the RPM discussion the free rider 
is rarely seen as a signal that points to chances of new services, products, 
institutional or organizational solutions. RPM serves as a conservative device 
for good old trade structures. It is not an option that fosters efficiency or 
increases consumer benefits. I would not use the free rider proposition as an 
argument in favor of generally legalizing RPM (the easy way) but as one in 
favor of deregulation and allowing new institutions to develop. The argument 
"either RPM or lack of service for the consumer" seems much too simple and 
implies a static world. RPM was one result of a dynamic trade world 200 years 
ago. Today, it is too comfortable a solution and restricts institutional innova- 
tion. As there are now diverse other potential ways of providing consumer 
service, the conservation of RPM which tends to prevent price competition is 
not acceptable. 
Of course, an overall evaluation of RPM is not the aspiration of Prof. Breit's 
paper; but the historical landmarks he reports stimulate the economic discus- 
sion on the subject. Arguments brought forward in favor of RPM even by some 
new institutional economists are not acceptable if the dynamics of markets and 
institutions are taken into account. 
FINK [l9881 offers an inspiring interpretation of RPM on grounds of information 
and market process theory. 
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